

## Student Guide

### Guideline B: Foreign Influence

Objective	To help the learner identify Foreign Influence security concerns as outlined in the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, December 29, 2005.
POC	PersonnelSecurity.Training@dss.mil
Estimated Completion Time	20 Minutes

#### Screen 1

Meet Kian Milani. He is a 37 year old Network Administrator employed by a U. S. government contractor. Recently, he was selected for a new contract position requiring Top Secret eligibility and access. Kian submitted the required paperwork to initiate his security background investigation through his security office.

Now, your task is to review Kian's file and make an eligibility determination. Please note that other adjudicative guidelines may apply. In this case you will focus only on Guideline B: Foreign Influence.

#### Screen 2

The most important part of an adjudicator's job is to examine a sufficient period of a person's life to determine whether or not the person is an acceptable security risk.

This task should never be taken lightly as cleared personnel may eventually have access to classified information.

Adjudicators take into consideration all relevant information, both favorable and unfavorable from a person's past and present to form the "whole-person" concept, when making an eligibility determination.

#### Screen 3

In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:

- The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
- The circumstances surrounding the conduct to include knowledgeable participation;
- The frequency and recency of the conduct;
- The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
- The extent to which participation is voluntary;
- The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavior changes;

- The motivation for the conduct;
- The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
- The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

#### **Screen 4**

Guideline B: Foreign Influence, states that foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

When reviewing Kian's investigative file, you read that Kian has close foreign ties, undisclosed foreign travel, and a potential coercive situation regarding his family members abroad.

Click on the folder to review the details in Kian's file.

(File folder information)

- Kian is a naturalized United States citizen from Iran. His immediate family (father, mother and two sisters) still reside in Iran.
- During the subject interview, Kian stated he has a close relationship with family members in Iran, but they are not aware of his association with the United States government. He also reported to the investigator he could not be pressured into providing any information or other assistance to Iran as he hated the current government and did not believe in it.
- Investigative records disclosed Kian made four trips to Iran within the timeframe of his background investigation. This information was not reported on the SF-86, to his supervisor, or the security office.
- Kian was re-interviewed regarding potential counterintelligence (CI) issues. He stated that Iranian government officials have made threats against his family. These officials advised that if Kian did not cooperate and provide certain information when he went to work for the U.S. Government, his family members would be executed.
- Kian stated he was planning to report this information to the security office, but had not done so. He also agreed to a counterintelligence-scope polygraph to confirm this. The polygraph was inconclusive on whether Kian told his relatives about his job and access to classified information.

**Screen 5**

Does the information in Kian's file raise a valid security concern under Guideline B: Foreign Influence?

Click on the file folder to review the file and select the disqualifier(s) that apply to Kian's case.

Then click on the Submit button.

**Screen 6**

Kian's foreign contacts, unlisted foreign travel, and his vulnerability to coercion by a foreign entity is a security concern, but each Adjudicative Guideline has specific mitigating conditions that sometimes allow an applicant to be cleared in spite of the concern.

Do any mitigating conditions apply to Kian's case?

Click on the file folder to review the file and select the mitigator(s) that apply to Kian's case.

Then click on the Submit button.

**Screen 7**

The information from Kian's background investigation raised concerns under Guideline B: Foreign Influence.

Although Kian told the investigator that he opposes the Iranian government and could not be coerced or pressured, the investigation revealed that Kian *is* vulnerable as he has a close and continuing relationship with foreign nationals, which has heightened his risk. Since the foreign entity has threatened to kill his mother, father and sisters, it is unknown what he may do in order to protect them. There is also CI information indicating that he may be at risk and there is doubt as to whether he would have voluntarily reported the coercion to U.S officials. It also is not clear as to how the Iranian officials were aware of his employment with the U.S. government.

Foreign Influence disqualifying conditions cannot be mitigated in this case and the information is sufficient to warrant an adverse eligibility determination.

When making a security eligibility determination, remember that an investigative file may have multiple adjudicative concerns. This Security Training Short focuses only on Adjudication B: Foreign Influence.

For information on all the Adjudicative Guidelines, please see the other Shorts developed by CDSE. To review Guideline B: Foreign Influence conditions of concern and mitigation, click on the Job Aid button.