Any line of questioning concerning military- or intelligence-based contracts or dual-use technology should be viewed as suspicious behavior.

Even if an appropriate authority grants a foreign visitor access to classified U.S. information, that visitor is NOT entitled to classified information unless he/she has an express need to know that has been communicated and verified in advance of the visit.

DoD strongly recommends that you inform your DSS industrial security representative or DSS field counterintelligence (CI) specialist in advance of foreign visits. Given adequate time, they can assist with identifying the risk to the cleared company, its technology, or its personnel.

Please share this document with the security staff of your facility, and any other DoD-cleared facility affiliated with your company, regarding foreign delegation or representative visits.

Contractor personnel should develop standard acceptable responses to suspicious questions for which the answers may be classified, are not applicable to the country visit, or include proprietary information.

- Prior to the visit, brief all personnel working with the delegation on what they can and cannot discuss.
- If the delegation attempts to make additional contacts with escorts and speakers, make sure they keep discussions to the agreed-upon topics and information.
- Conduct a walkthrough of the facility to ensure the visitors will not have audible or visible unauthorized access. Escorts should maintain visual contact with all visitors at all times.
- If these or any other suspicious incidents occur, please ensure that they are reported immediately to your security office.


Report suspicious activity to your local security contact. Your DSS point of contact is:

TIPS

VISITOR TIPS

Preparing for FOREIGN VISITORS
INTERNATIONAL VISITS

International visits are a common part of everyday business in today’s global economy and are a welcome opportunity to boost any business; the cleared contractor is no exception to this trend in the international market.

While most visitors are here for legitimate purposes, the sheer volume of visitors makes it difficult to detect those who come with ulterior motives.

Foreign delegation visits to cleared contractors are one of the most frequent methods of operation used to target the U.S. defense industry.


RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

Remember, it is cheaper for any foreign entity to elicit, improperly obtain, or buy new technology or the means of reproducing new technology than it is for it to fund initial research and development (R&D).

The United States (government and industry) expends more funds on R&D than any other country in the world, making U.S. contractors a prime target for foreign collection of both classified and unclassified commercial technology.

When a foreign visit occurs at your facility, awareness is essential to prevention. Watch for any of the techniques or indicators listed to the right to help assess the potential for visitor targeting or collection.

TECHNIQUES

- **Peppering:** Visitors asking the same question in different styles or one visitor asking the same question to multiple U.S. contractor employees

- **Wandering Visitor:** The visitor uses the distraction provided by a large delegation to slip away, out of the control of the escort

- **Divide and Conquer:** Visitors take the U.S. team members into different areas to discuss issues in order to deprive the U.S. person of his safety net of assistance in answering questions

- **Switch Visitors:** A collector added to the group without leaving enough time for a background check on the new visitor

- **Bait and Switch:** The visitors say they are coming to discuss business that is acceptable for discussion, but after they arrive their agenda switches to different questions and discussion topics

- **Distraught Visitor:** When the visitor’s questions are not answered he/she acts insulted or creates an uncomfortable scene in an attempt to psychologically coerce information from the target