Targeting U.S. Technologies

Executive Summary

Key Findings

A. Key Findings In response to Department of Defense (DoD) guidance, DSS publishes this report to detail and analyze possible foreign targeting of information and technologies developed or maintained within the Cleared Defense Contractor (CDC) community. The principal substance of this report is drawn from DSS analysis of suspicious contacts with foreign entities as reported by the CDC community during fiscal years 2006 and 2007 (FY06-FY07). The following constitutes key findings based on DSS analysis of data received from the defense industry during FY06-FY07:

  • The number of reports DSS receives from CDCs detailing foreign contacts evaluated as "suspicious" continues to grow exponentially. This is likely attributable in part to the explosive growth of the Internet and the ever-increasing opportunity it affords for uninhibited and unfiltered global contact, but it is also likely indicative of hostile entities' increased exploitation of the Internet to target critical defense technologies. Enhanced CDC threat awareness is also partially responsible for increased recognition and reporting of suspicious incidents.

  • Contacts originating from the East Asia and the Pacific region constitute, by far, the greatest number of suspicious contacts attributable to a specific region of origin. The nature and disproportionate extent of these contacts suggest a concerted effort to exploit contact for competitive, economic, and military advantage.

  • DSS identified a shift in the affiliation of the entities making suspicious contacts. In most region-specific analyses, the majority of contacts originated from commercial entities vice those affiliated with governmental entities. This is likely a purposeful attempt to make the contacts seem more innocuous by using non-governmental entities as surrogate collectors for interested government or government affiliated entities. It also likely reflects the growing and increasingly interconnected global economy.

  • Exploitation of cyberspace as a vehicle for surreptitious access to information resident on CDC data systems is a growing concern, and it constitutes a significant portion of contacts that DSS deems "suspicious." The ability to field effective security countermeasures to oppose this persistent threat and to mitigate the ability of hostile elements to control the information battlefield requires constant diligence.

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